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ENJOINING POLITICAL PROTEST STRIKES
On January 9, 1980, in response to the Soviet Union's invasion of
Afghanistan, the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) insti-
tuted a boycott against all Russian imports and exports.1 ILA members
refused to load or unload any ship bound for or arriving from the Soviet
Union.2 In response to the boycott, stevedoring companies and other af-
fected businesses initiated proceedings to compel the union employees
to return to work.3 Efforts to end the ILA action have relied on two ap-
proaches. Some complainants have sought to enjoin the ILA boycott
under the Labor Management Relations Act,' by filing unfair labor prac-
tice charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) or bring-
ing a private suit.' Others have attempted to enjoin the boycott pending
mandatory arbitration proceedings or to enforce an arbitration award.'
The First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits recently addressed the issues raised
by the two approaches to ending the boycott.' The Fifth Circuit held that
the secondary boycott provisions of the Labor Management Relations
Act did not prohibit the ILA boycott.' In a second case, the same circuit
ruled that the boycott, although politically motivated, was entitled to
' Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 630 F.2d 864, 866 (1st Cir. 1980). The
ILA leadership ordered rank and file union members to cease immediately the handling of
all Russian ships and cargoes. Id. at 866 n.1. The order exempted only those ships currently
being loaded or unloaded. Id. The union cited the present state of United States-Soviet rela-
tions and employee sentiments as reasons for taking the union action. Id. The boycott was
to continue as long as the Russians continued to be "international bully boys." Id.
Id. at 866.
3 See, e.g., Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368 (1st
Cir. 1981); Hampton Roads Shipping Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 631 F.2d
282 (4th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Jan. 13,1981) (No. 80-1058);
Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 630 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1980); New Orleans S.S.
Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom.
Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 49 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S.
Mar. 30, 1981) (No. 80-1045); Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445
(5th Cir. 1980).
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976).
5 640 F.2d at 1370; 630 F.2d at 866; 626 F.2d at 448. The Labor Management Relations
Act prohibits employers and employees from engaging in certain labor-related actions, and
empowers the NLRB to seek an injunction against such actions when a complaint is filed. 29
U.S.C. § 158, 160 (1976); see note 30 infra. The Act also allows a party injured by certain un-
fair labor practices to bring a private suit. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976); see text accompanying
note 49 infra.
6 631 F.2d at 283-84; 626 F.2d at 459-61.
See, e.g., Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368 (1st
Cir. 1981); Hampton Roads Shipping Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 631 F.2d
282 (4th Cir. 1980); New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455 (5th
Cir. 1980); Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
' 626 F.2d at 454; see text accompanying notes 26-31 infra.
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protection under the Norris-LaGuardia Act's9 ban on labor injunctions. ' °
The Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion that the Fifth Circuit
reached in the latter case, holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act pro-
hibited an injunction against the ILA boycott.' The First Circuit
disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion regarding the former issue,
and held that the ILA action violated the Labor Management Relations
Act's proscription of secondary boycotts. 2
In Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Association,' the Fifth
Circuit refused to enjoin the ILA boycott as a violation of the Labor
Management Relations Act on the ground that the boycott did not satisfy
the act's jurisdictional requirements." The Labor Management Relations
Act applies only to activities "in commerce" or "affecting commerce" as
those terms are defined in the Act. 5 The Baldovin court relied on a
series of Supreme Court decisions in which the Court refused to apply
the Labor Management Relations Act to disputes involving foreign
ships.6 The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that such disputes do
not affect commerce as the Act requires.'
7
9 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
'0 626 F.2d at 468-69. The Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives the federal courts of jurisdic-
tion to issue injunctions in labor cases. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976); see note 70 infra.
" 631 F.2d at 286.
12 640 F.2d at 1379.
11 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 448-54.
,5 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(6)-(7) (1976); see note 17 infra.
" 626 F.2d at 448-54. The Supreme Court has held federal labor law inapplicable to
disputes involving foreign ships. American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215,
228 (1974); Windward Shipping Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104, 113-16 (1974); In-
cres S.S. Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1963); McCulloch
v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 22 (1963); Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1957).
Many merchant shipowners, Americans among them, register their vessels in alien
countries. See generally Comment, Foreign Ships in American Ports: The Question of
NLRB Jurisdiction, 9 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 50 (1975). The term "foreign ship" as used in this
note refers to a vessel registered in a country other than the United States, regardless of
the owner's nationality.
"7 American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 221-25 (1974); Windward
Shipping Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104, 105-06 (1974); Incres S.S. Co. v. Inter-
national Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24, 27 (1963); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 17-22 (1963).
Congress derives the authority to regulate labor-management relations from the com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Polish Nat'l
Alliance of the United States of N. America v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 649-50 (1944); Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 221 (1938); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1936). The Court has upheld a statute that regulates the behavior of
foreign crews and ships as a legitimate exercise of Congress' power under the commerce
clause. See Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 179 (1903) (upholding Seaman's Act of
1898, 30 Stat. 755, 763 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 599 (1976)). In NLRB v. Reliance Fuel
Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963), the Supreme Court stated that Congress intended the scope
of the Labor Management Relations Act to be as broad as the commerce clause would allow.
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The Fifth Circuit, in Baldovin, focused on the two most recent cases
in the foreign ship series, Windward Shipping, Ltd. v. American Radio
Association18 and American Radio Association v. Mobile Steamship
Association.9 Both cases arose from the picketing of foreign ships by six
American maritime unions." The unions' dispute centered on foreign
shipping only, and concerned substandard wages paid to foreign crews."
In each case, the complaining party had sought a state court injunction
against the union picketing.' The Supreme Court held in both cases that
Id. at 226. Nevertheless, in holding that disputes involving foreign ships' are not in coin-
merce within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act, the Supreme Court has
concluded that while Congress could have subjected such disputes to regulations under the
Act, Congress did not intend to do so. Windward Shipping Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n,
415 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1974); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10, 20 (1963); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1957).
Section 1 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), expresses
Congress' objective to reach labor-management issues in or affecting commerce. The Act
defines "commerce" as "[tirade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among
the several States ... or between any foreign country and any State .. ." 29 U.S.C. § 152(6)
(1976). "Affecting commerce" is defined as "[i]n commerce, or burdening or obstructing com-
merce or the free flow of commerce,...." 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1976). In this note, the phrases
"in commerce" and "affecting commerce" refer to the Labor Management Relations Act
definitions.
"5 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
19 419 U.S. 215 (1974).
Id. at 217; 415 U.S. at 106-07.
I, 419 U.S. at 217 n.2; 415 U.S. at 106-07. The unions in Windward and Mobile asserted
that the payment of low wages by foreign shipowners resulted in the loss of jobs for
American seamen. 419 U.S. at 217 n.2; 415 U.S. at 106-07. The unions picketed to protest
this loss of American jobs. 419 U.S. at 217 n.2; 415 U.S. at 106-07. In International
Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970), the Supreme
Court reasoned that the purpose of union picketing of foreign ships is important in deter-
mining whether such picketing affects commerce within the meaning of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act. Id. at 199-200. In Ariadne, an American union picketed foreign ships
that used crewmen and non-union American workers to do longshore work. Id. at 196-97.
The Supreme Court held that the picketing was "in commerce" because the underlying ob-
jective of the picketing was to improve the position of American longshore workers. Id. at
199-200.
The Ariadne decision appeared to exclude all picketing designed to promote American
labor interests from the general rule that labor disputes involving foreign ships are not "in
commerce" as defined by the Labor Management Relations Act. See id.; note 17 supra. The
pre-Ariadne cases that had held such disputes were not "in commerce" all involved union at-
tempts to influence or interfere with the on-board management and affairs of foreign ships.
See Incres S.S. Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963) (union at-
tempts to organize crew of foreign ship); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (attempt to organize foreign crew); Benz v. Campania Naviera
Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957) (union sympathy picketing in support of wage and working con-
dition demands of foreign crew). Windward and Mobile indicate, however, that the Ariadne
exception may not be quite so broad. See note 24 infra.
' 419 U.S. at 218; 415 U.S. at 105. Sections 7 and 8 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1976), have preempted state law with respect to labor-
management activities that either section governs. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959). Section 7 describes certain protected employee activities,
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the union activities did not affect commerce within the meaning of the
Labor Management Relations Act. The Court reasoned that the re-
sponses by the shipowners which would satisfy the unions did not relate
to traditional wage-cost decisions directly benefitting American
workers.24 As a result, the Court found the Labor Management Relations
Act inapplicable, and allowed the state courts to assume jurisdiction
over the disputes.'
In Baldovin, the complainants filed unfair labor practice charges
with the NLRB, alleging that the ILA had violated the secondary boy-
cott provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act.2" Section
8(b)(4)(B) of the Act prohibits union activity directed at an employer or
while section 8 lists a number of prohibited employer anl employee practices. 29 U.S.C. §§
157, 158 (1976). The Garmon Court held that when it is reasonable to assume that the ac-
tivities at issue are protected by § 7 or prohibited by § 8, the states must defer to the
jurisdiction of the NLRB. 359 U.S. at 244. If § 7 or § 8 does not cover the activity, the states
may regulate the activity. 419 U.S. at 228.
In Windward, the unions argued that the state court lacked jurisdiction because the
union picketing was a protected activity under § 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
415 U.S. at 108-09. In Mobile, the unions contended that the Act had preempted state law
because the picketing was a prohibited activity under § 8 of the Act. 419 U.S. at 219-20.
419 U.S. at 224; 415 U.S. at 106. In Windward, the foreign owner of one of the
picketed ships had sought an injunction, while in Mobile the plaintiffs were American
stevedoring companies. 419 U.S. at 219; 415 U.S. at 105-06. The difference in the identity of
the complaining parties in the two cases was sufficient to cause a Justice in the Windward
majority to dissent in Mobile. 419 U.S. at 236-44 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The Mobile dis-
sent argued that a dispute between American unions and American businesses was "in com-
merce" even if the unions' dispute with the foreign shipowners in Windward was not. Id.;
see note 17 supra & note 40 infra.
419 U.S. at 222-25; 415 U.S. at 115. Although the unions' objective in Mobile and
Windward was to influence domestic labor affairs by persuading people to patronize
American manned vessels, 419 U.S. at 217 n.2; 415 U.S. at 106-07, the Supreme Court did
not find International Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S.
195 (1970), to be controlling. 419 U.S. at 223 n.9; 415 U.S. at 115. Ariadne had held that union
action with the underlying purpose of influencing domestic labor affairs, even though in-
volving a foreign ship, was "in commerce" for Labor Management Relations Act jurisdic-
tional purposes. 397 U.S. at 199-200; see note 21 supra. In Mobile, the Court distinguished
Ariadne by noting that American workers were among those receiving the substandard
wages in Ariadne. 419 U.S. at 223 n.9. The Windward Court characterized the dispute in
Ariadne as one which could have been resolved by increasing the wages paid to American
workers. 415 U.S. at 114. Thus, the Court reasoned that the union in Ariadne merely was
seeking traditional labor concessions for American employees, while in Windward and
Mobile the unions sought to influence the wages paid to foreign employees. 419 U.S. at 223
n.9; 415 U.S. at 112-15. The Mobile Court recognized that the unions' interest in foreign
labor relations was caused by union concern over the adverse effect of substandard foreign
wages on the American job market. See 419 U.S. at 218 n.2. Yet the Court did not find the
domestic purpose exception of Ariadne applicable. Id, at 223 n.9. Thus, Windward and
Mobile shift the focus from the underlying purpose behind the union action to the im-
mediate response the union hopes to elicit. See 419 U.S. at 22-24; 415 U.S. at 114-15; note 21
supra.
2 419 U.S. at 232; 415 U.S. at 115-16; see note 22 supra.
" 626 F.2d at 448.
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any other person with whom the union has no dispute and which seeks to
force that employer or person to cease doing business with the actual
target of the union's action.' The complaining parties in Baldovin claimed
that they were the targets of a secondary boycott on the ground that
they had no dispute with the ILA, and because the boycott was designed
to force them to stop dealing with the Soviets. 8 Pursuant to section 10(1)
of the Labor Management Relations Act 9 the NLRB filed suit in federal
district court to enjoin the union boycott pending final disposition of the
charges." On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found Windward and Mobile con-
trolling and held that the NLRB did not have jurisdiction to petition the
district court for an injunction because the ILA boycott did not affect
commerce.
3 1
Although the ILA dispute did not involve typical labor-management
issues such as wages and working conditions, the Baldovin court concluded
that the Windward/Mobile standards for determining NLRB jurisdic-
tions aplied to the case.32 The court reasoned that the rationale of Wind-
- 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341
U.S. 675, 687 (1951). The focus of § 8(b)(4)(B) is on secondary union activity, rather than on
legitimate primary activity directed at an employer. Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers
v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 672-73 (1961); see note 38 infra.
1 626 F.2d at 452. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the complainants in Baldovin that the
ILA action was secondary activity within the meaning of § 8(b}(4)(B) of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act. Id. at 449. Since the union's dispute was with the Soviet Union, the ac-
tion against the shipping and stevedoring companies was secondary. Id.
29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976).
626 F.2d at 448. When an employer files unfair labor practices charges under §
8(b)(4)(B) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976), the NLRB
must make an immediate investigation of the charges. 29 U.S.C. § 160(0) (1976). If that in-
vestigation provides the Board with reasonable cause to believe that the charges are true,
the Board must send an officer to federal district court to seek a temporary injunction pend-
ing final NLRB disposition of the matter. Id.
In Baldovin, the Fifth Circuit consolidated appeals from two district court decisions,
Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, No. 80-259 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 1980), and
Mack v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 104 L.R.R.M. 2892 (S.D. Ga. 1980). 626 F.2d at
448. The district court in Baldovin had denied the § 160(0) temporary injunction, while the
district court in Mack had issued an injunction. Id.
1 626 F.2d at 452-54. In addition to the Labor Management Relations Act's general
language limiting the Act's coverage to matters in or affecting commerce, see note 17 supra,
the secondary boycott provisions are limited specifically to disputes in or affecting com-
merce. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976); see 626 F.2d at 449.
SId. at 452. The Baldovin court cited a recent NLRB decision for the proposition that
the Windward/Mobile test for determining NLRB jurisdiction, which looks to the manage-
ment reponses to union action, see text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra, is not limited to
disputes involving traditional labor-management issues. 626 F.2d at 452. In National
Maritime Union of America (Shippers Stevedoring), 245 NLRB No. 29, 102 L.R.R.M. 1487
(1979), an American union had picketed a Russian ship, protesting the transporting of
American cargo by Russian ships. 102 L.R.R.M. at 1487. The NLRB applied the Wind-
wardMobile response test and held that the union pickets were not "in commerce" because
the predictable response of the shipowner would not relate to traditional American labor-
management issues. Id at 1488; see text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra. Notwithstand-
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ward and Mobile is at least as appropriate to a strike protesting a
foreign nation's policies as it is to a strike involving foreign labor rela-
tions.3 Since the ILA's actions in Baldovin were even less related to
traditional American labor concerns than was the picketing in Wind-
ward and Mobile, the Fifth Circuit found the Windward/Mobile reason-
ing compelling.34 Thus, in accordance with Windward and Mobile, the
court focused on the ILA's objective and the responses that would
satisfy the union. 5 The court found that the ILA's goal was to force a
change in Soviet policy in another part of the world, and that only a
political response by the Soviet government would satisfy the union.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that since Windward and Mobile held that
union activity designed to influence a foreign employer's relation with
its employees does not affect commerce, union actions designed to in-
fluence a foreign nation's relations with another country a fortiori do not
affect commerce. 7
The Baldovin court based its decision that the ILA boycott did not
affect commerce on the finding that the union's primary dispute was
with the Soviet Union. The court did, however, discuss two cases which
ing the fact that the union actions were not directed at labor-management relations on
board the foreign ship, the Board found Windward and Mobile controlling. 102 L.R.R.M. at
1488. The NLRB thus did not read Windward and Mobile as limited to cases involving ship-
board labor relations. Id.; see note 24 supra.
626 F.2d at 453.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra.
626 F.2d at 453-54.
38 Id. at 454. The NLRB argued in Baldovin that "an object" of the ILA boycott was to
force the American stevedoring companies to stop doing business with the Russian ships.
Id. at 452; see text accompanying note 43 infra. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument,
holding that the union's sole objective was to voice a political protest, and that the only
response satisfactory to the union would be a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. 626 F.2d
at 452-54.
Id. at 453-54.
Id. at 452-54. Primary union activity is that activity directed at the party with whom
the union has a dispute. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 623 (1967).
Unlike the union's dispute in Baldovin, a union's primary dispute generally is with an
employer. Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1377-78
(1st Cir. 1981).
By relying on Windward and Mobile, the Baldovin court indicated that the political
nature of the ILA boycott did not mandate a finding that the boycott did not come within
the coverage of the Labor Management Relations Act. See 626 F.2d at 453 (noting that
boycott's political aspects merely reinforced conclusion drawn from Windward and Mobile).
Contrary to Baldovin, in NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992 (4th
Cir. 1964), the Fourth Circuit held that a longshoremen's boycott markedly similar to the
ILA's boycott of Russian cargoes was outside the coverage of the Act solely because the ac-
tion was politically motivated. Id. at 996. In International, the ILA had boycotted all ships
that recently had done business with Cuba. Id. at 993-94. As in Baldovin, a stevedoring com-
pany had filed unfair labor practice charges against an ILA local. Id. at 994. The NLRB had
sought federal court enforcement of a cease and desist order that the Board had issued to
the union. Id. at 995. The Fourth Circuit refused to enforce the NLRB order, holding that
the Board was without jurisdiction because the case did not involve a labor dispute as defined
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had held that the NLRB had jurisdiction over secondary activity affect-
ing commerce even though the primary dispute did not affect commerce.
3 9
The Fifth Circuit distinguished those cases as involving union attempts
to influence relations between American employers and employees,
while the ILA sought only to influence activity abroad." The court ad-
in § 2(9) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(9). Id. at 995-96. The Inter-
national court stated that Congress intended the Labor Management Relations Act to serve
as a mechanism for regulating labor disputes. Id. at 995; see Marine Cooks & Stewarts v.
Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 372 (1960) (noting in dictum that Act designed to regulate
labor disputes). The Fourth Circuit thus reasoned that political protest strikes do not come
within the coverage of the Act. 332 F.2d at 995-96. At least one circuit has criticized the
Fourth Circuit's holding in International. See National Maritime Union of America v.
NLRB, 346 F.2d 411, 415 (D.C. Cir.) (questioning Fourth Circuit rule that presence of labor
dispute is jurisdictional prerequisite to application of Labor Management Relations Act),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965).
See 626 F.2d at 453 n.5 (discussing Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill Workers
Local 418 v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967), and Madden v.
Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill Workers Local 418, 334 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965)).
0 Id In the Grain Elevator cases, note 39 supra, a Canadian union had a dispute with a
Canadian shipping company. 376 F.2d at 775; 334 F.2d at 1016. In support of the Canadian
union, an American union local refused to handle goods shipped by the Canadian firm. 376
F.2d at 775; 334 F.2d at 1016. An American company that employed members of the
American union filed unfair labor practice charges against the union based on the secondary
boycott provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, and the NLRB sought a tem-
porary injunction. 376 F.2d at 775; 334 F.2d at 1016; see note 30 supra. In each case the cir-
cuit court issued the injunction, holding that even though the primary disputes involved a
foreign concern, the secondary dispute between the American union and employer put the
union activity within the scope of the Labor Management Relations Act. 376 F.2d at 780;
334 F.2d at 1019.
In distinguishing the Grain Elevator cases, the Baldovin court characterized the Grain
Elevator union's objective as an effort to force the American company to cease doing
business with the foreign shipper. 626 F.2d at 453 n.5. This objective was the same objective
that the court refused to ascribe to the ILA boycott in Baldovin. Id. at 452; see note 36
supra. Yet, in the Grain Elevator cases, as in Baldovin, the American employer was a
neutral party in the union's dispute with the foreign entity. 376 F.2d at 780-81. The Baldovin
court recognized the difficulties with its distinction of the Grain Elevator cases, calling the
difference between the cases "solely one of degree." 626 F.2d at 453 n.5.
In Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trade Council v. Broome, 377 U.S. 126 (1964), the Supreme
Court seemed to adopt the holding of the Grain Elevator cases that secondary disputes "in
commerce" satisfied Labor Management Relations Act jurisdictional requirements even
when the primary dispute was outside of commerce. See id. at 126. In a per curiam opinion,
the Broome Court reversed a state court's exercise of jurisdiction over a labor dispute. Id.
at 127. The Court ruled that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction under San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), see note 22 supra, even though the primary
target of the union's activities was not "in commerce." 377 U.S. at 126-27. The Court held
that the NLRB's jurisdictional standards may be satisfied by reference to either the
primary or secondary employer. Id. at. 126. Since the secondary employer was "in com-
merce," the Broome Court held that the NLRB had jurisdiction over the dispute. Id. at
126-27.
Four justices of the Supreme Court thought that Broome should control in Mobile,
finding the two cases indistinguishable. See 419 U.S. at 238 (Stewart, J., dissenting); note 23
1981]
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mitted that the ILA boycott was secondary activity within the meaning
of the Act and had harmed American interests,"' but held that any such
harm was an incidental effect of the boycott.4 The court did not view the
resulting effect on American concerns as an "object" of the boycott,
thereby failing to find a necessary element of a section 8(b)(4)(B) viola-
tion.43 The court thus held that the secondary effect of the ILA boycott
upon the complaining parties was insufficient to bring the boycott within
the jurisdictional boundaries of the Labor Management Relations Act.44
In Allied Internationa4 Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Asso-
ciation,45 the First Circuit disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's holding
in Baldovin that the Labor Management Relations Act did not apply to
the ILA boycott. Allied involved a private suit against the ILA by an
American importer.47 The plaintiff, Allied, Inc., alleged that the ILA ac-
tion was a secondary boycott in violation of section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act.48
Allied sued for injunctive relief and damages under section 303 of the
Act, which provides a private right of action for any party injured by a
secondary boycott. 9 The First Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of Allied's suit, holding that because the ILA boycott had af-
fected commerce the boycott was subject to the proscription of secon-
supra. The majority in Mobile distinguished Broome by stating that Broome merely involved
internal NLRB jurisdictional standards established pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 164(c), rather
than the statutory jurisdictional requirements of the Labor Management Relations Act. 419
U.S. at 225-26. The Fifth Circuit's failure to mention Broome in Baldovin is understandable
in light of the Mobile treatment of Broome.
4 626 F.2d at 449, 452; see note 28 supra.
626 F.2d at 452.
" Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976); see note 36 supra.
626 F.2d at 453-54.
640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1369-70.
,s Id. at 1370; see text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra. In addition to claiming that
the ILA had violated the Labor Management Relations Act, the plaintiff in Allied alleged
that the union had violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), and had committed a tort
against Allied under admiralty law. 640 F.2d at 1370. Discussion of the latter two theories,
which are beyond the scope of this note, can be found in the Allied opinion. See id. at
1379-82. For a thorough treatment of Sherman Act applicability to political boycotts, see
Comment, Political Boycotts and the Sherman Act, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 617 (1980).
11 640 F.2d at 1370, 1379; 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976). Section 303(b) of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1976), expressly authorizes private suits to recover
damages but does not mention injunctions. Courts have consistently held that § 303 does not
authorize suits for injunctive relief. E.g., lodice v. Calabrese, 345 F. Supp. 248, 270 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd in part rev d in part on other grounds, 512 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1975); Amalgamated
Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 170 F.2d 902,
904, 907 (8th Cir. 1948). Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of injunc-
tion actions under § 303, the Court has narrowly construed the cause of action authorized by
that section. See Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1964) (section 303 suit
limited to recovering actual damages proved; no punitive damages).
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dary boycotts in section 8(b)(4)(B). The court refused to apply the Wind-
ward/Mobile rule that a dispute between an American union and a
foreign employer, not designed to elicit concessions directly beneficial
to American workers, does not affect commerce." The Allied court
distinguished Windward and Mobile on the ground that the current
primary dispute, albeit between an American union and a foreign entity,
had spawned a labor-related dispute involving only Americans." Since
the ILA did not seek to influence the employment practices of a foreign
concern, the Allied court held that Windward and Mobile did not
preclude application of the Labor Management Relations Act to the ILA
boycott."
In addition to distinguishing Supreme Court precedent, the First
Circuit disputed the Fifth Circuit's finding in Baldovin that the sole ob-
ject of the ILA boycott was to voice a political protest.4 The Allied court
found that an object of the boycott was to force the plaintiff to cease im-
porting Russian goods.5 The court thus held that the boycott met the
definition of a secondary boycott in section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Labor
61 640 F.2d at 1370-79. The district court in Allied had granted the union's motion to
dismiss the plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Id. at 1369 n.1; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Since the district court also had con-
sidered affidavits submitted by the parties, the circuit court treated the defendant's motion
as one for summary judgment. 640 F.2d at 1369 n.1; see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Thus the First
Circuit's decision in Allied was limited to finding a properly stated cause of action against
the ILA, and remanding the case to the district court for trial. 640 F.2d at 1379.
The district iourt had consolidated Allied with Walsh v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 488 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass. 1980), vacated and remanded, 630 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1980).
In Walsh, after the affected party (Allied) had filed unfair labor practice charges against the
ILA, the NLRB sought a temporary injunction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976). 630 F.2d
at 865-67; see note 30 supra. On appeal of the district court order denying the injunction, the
First Circuit dismissed the NLRB's petition on the ground of res judicata. 630 F.2d at 867.
The court held that the district court decision in Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, No. 80-259 (S.D. Tex. 1980), which had denied the NLRB a § 160(1) injunction, barred
the NLRB from bringing a similar action in Walsh. 630 F.2d at 867-75. The First Circuit did
not dismiss the Allied suit on res judicata grounds because Allied involved different parties
than those involved in both Baldovin and Walsh. 640 F.2d at 1378. While Allied was a suit
by a private plaintiff, Walsh and Baldovin both involved suits between the ILA and the
NLRB. Id.; 630 F.2d at 870-73.
11 640 F.2d at 1373-74; see text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra.
52 640 F.2d at 1374.
Id.; see note 24 supra.
640 F.2d at 1374-77; see note 36 supra.
640 F.2d at 1374-77. The Allied court determined the object of the ILA boycott, as
required by § 8(b)(4)(B) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B), by
looking to the inevitable consequences of the boycott. 640 F.2d at 1376; see NLRB v. Retail
Store Employees Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 614 n.9 (1980) (holding union responsible
for foreseeable consequences of its conduct). Since the ILA had ordered its members to
refrain from handling the plaintiff's imports, the court held that an inevitable result of the
union action was to force the plaintiff to cease doing business with its Russian suppliers. 640
F.2d at 1377; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976); text accompanying note 27 supra.
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Management Relations Act.,6 The First Circuit also ascribed more impor-
tance to the boycott's effect on American companies than did the Fifth
Circuit in Baldovin.5 7 The Allied court concluded that the impact of the
ILA boycott on the American plaintiff was sufficient to bring the
boycott within the scope of the Labor Management Relations Act. 8
New Orleans Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers-9
involved the second approach to enjoining the ILA boycott. In New
Orleans, which arose from management attempts to enjoin the boycott
in furtherance of mandatory arbitration provisions, the Fifth Circuit
upheld an injunction issued to enforce an arbitration order, but vacated
an injunction issued pending arbitration."0 The Fifth Circuit consolidated
the appeals of two cases involving four separate collective bargaining
agreements with six union locals. 1 Each agreement contained a no-strike
clause accompanied by a mandatory arbitration procedure. 2 In one case,
the parties had submitted the disputes to arbitration." The arbitrators
ruled that the ILA boycott violated the no-strike clauses and ordered
the unions back to work. 4 The employers of the ILA workers sued to en-
force the orders under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, which allows a party to a collective bargainjng agreement to sue in
federal court to enforce the agreement. 5 The district court ordered the
union employees to return to work.6 In the second case, the employer
640 F.2d at 1374-78; see text accompanying note 27 supra; note 55 supra.
5 640 F.2d at 1371-74; see text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
640 F.2d at 1374. The Allied court relied heavily on footnote 10 of the Mobile deci-
sion. Id. at 1373-74. That footnote stated that Mobile need not cast doubt upon cases holding
that § 8(b)(4)(B) governs secondary activity in commerce even though the primary dispute is
outside of commerce. 419 U.S. at 225 n.10 (citing Grain Elevator cases as examples); see
note 40 supra. The First Circuit took the Supreme Court at its word and cited the Grain
Elevator cases as support for holding that § 8(b)(4)(B) applied to the ILA's secondary action
against its American employer although the primary dispute with the Soviets was outside
commerce. 640 F.2d at 1373-74; but see id. at 1383 (Aldrich, J., dissenting) (dissenting judge
stating that Mobile casts considerable doubt on Grain Elevator cases, footnote 10 of Mobile
notwithstanding).
s' 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 467.
" Id. at 458-61. The Fifth Circuit consolidated appeals from New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v.
General Longshore Workers, 486 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. La. 1980), and Jacksonville Bulk Ter-
minals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, No. 80-5089 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
" 626 F.2d at 459-60. Each union local in New Orleans had agreed not to engage in any
strike or work stoppage. Id. at 459-60 nn. 1 & 2. The unions also had agreed to arbitrate any
dispute involving issues subject to the respective collective bargaining agreements. Id. at
459-60. The arbitration requirements of each agreement excluded from arbitration disputes
involving issues outside the scope of the agreement. Id. at 459-60 nn. 1 & 3.
Id. at 459-60 (discussing New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 486
F. Supp. 409 (E.D. La. 1980)). At the district court level, the New Orleans case had involved
three of the four collective bargaining agreements before the Fifth Circuit. 626 F.2d at 460.
a4 I&.
' Id. at 465; 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
" 626 F.2d at 460. The order issued by the District Court of the Eastern District of
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sought an injunction against the boycott pending arbitration. 7 The
district court granted the management request."
The principal issue on appeal in New Orleans was whether the
Norris-LaGuardia Act's ban on labor injunctions prohibited the district
court injunctions -9 Section 4(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives the
Louisiana prohibited the union locals from engaging in work stoppages involving any ship
carrying grain to the Soviet Union. Id. Two of the three arbitration orders the court sought
to enforce applied only to the particular ship that the longshoremen had boycotted. Id.
Thus, the district court order went significantly beyond those two arbitration orders. Id.;
see note 76 infra.
626 F.2d at 460-61 (discussing Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, No. 80-5089 (M.D. Fla. 1980)). In Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, which
involved one of the four collective bargaining agreements before the Fifth Circuit, the
employer had sought a court order compelling the union to arbitrate in addition to a pre-
arbitration injunction. 626 F.2d at 460-61. The district court issued such an order. Id.; see
note 90 infra.
Id at 461.
Id. at 463-64. In New Orleans, the Fifth Circuit confronted three potentially
dispositive questions before determining the effect of the Norris-LaGuardia Act on the ILA
boycott. The court first held that the departure of the boycotted ships did not render the
case moot. Id. at 461-62. The court reasoned that since the dispute could not have been
litigated completely prior to the ships' departures, and since there was a reasonable expec-
tation that the complainants would face a similar boycott in the future, the case was not
moot. Id. at 462. Secondly, the court held that the first amendment did not prohibit an in-
junction against the ILA boycott. Id. at 462-63. Finally, the New Orleans court held that an
injunction against the ILA work stoppage would not violate the thirteenth amendment's
proscription of involuntary servitude, since individual employees were free to terminate
their employment at will. Id. at 463.
The question of whether an injunction against the ILA boycott would violate the first
amendment also arosb in the Allied case. 640 F.2d at 1378-79. The First Circuit in Allied
agreed with the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans that an injunction would not violate the ILA's
first amendment rights. Id. at 1379. The Supreme Court most often has considered the ques-
tion of first amendment protection of union activity in the context of active union picketing.
E.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980); Teamsters Local 695
v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers & Steam-
fitters v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953); Carpenters Local 213 v. Ritters Cafe, 315 U.S. 722
(1942). The physical presence of picketers can add considerable impact to the message that a
union attempts to convey. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001, 447 U.S. at 619
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). Nonetheless, the Court has held that when such picketing is
in violation of legitimate governmental interests, the first amendment will not protect the
pickets. American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 228-32 (1974); c.
Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. at 293-95 (fourteenth amendment does not pro-
hibit state court injunction against picketing violative of legitimate state interests).
Since the first amendment limits congressional power, a congressional proscription of
picketing alone cannot justify restriction of otherwise lawful picketing. NLRB v. Retail
Store Employees Local 1001, 447 U.S. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring). The harmful effects of
the union activity must be weighed against the right of free expression. Id. According to the
First and Fifth Circuits, the ILA activity was a secondary boycott as defined in the Labor
Management Relations Act. 640 F.2d at 1374-78; 626 F.2d at 448-49. Because the union's
mode of expression thus violated public policy, restrictions on that expression were per-
missible. 640 F.2d at 1378-79; 626 F.2d at 463. Even if the Labor Management Relations Act
were not applicable to the case, as in Baldovin, 626 F.2d at 452-53, the first amendment
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federal courts of jurisdiction to issue labor injunctions." This ban on
federal court injunctions is limited to cases involving labor disputes.7
The New Orleans court held that the ILA boycott, though instituted
purely for political reasons, was a labor dispute for Norris-LaGuardia
Act purposes.72 The Norris-LaGuardia Act's proscription of injunctions
thus applied to the ILA activity."
Application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the ILA boycott, how-
ever, did not mandate that the New Orleans court vacate the district
court injunctions.74 The Fifth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has
held that section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act created
an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act by permitting injunctions to
enforce valid arbitration orders.' The court thus upheld the injunction
would not shield the ILA activity if the activity violated state law. See American Radio
Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. at 230-32 (first amendment does not protect union activi-
ty that state court held violative of state law).
70 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976). Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states, in pertinent
part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested
in such dispute ... from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following
acts: (a) ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment; ...
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
"' Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 372 (1960). Section 13(c)
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act defines a labor dispute as a controversy over terms or condi-
tions of employment, or over representation of employees. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976).
626 F.2d at 465. In holding that a political protest strike is a labor dispute under §
113(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Fifth Circuit resolved a conflict within the court. Id.
In 1975 and 1976 decisions, separate panels of the Fifth Circuit disagreed on the applicability
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to a political protest action. Compare West Gulf Maritime
Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 531 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirming sum-
marily 413 F. Supp. 372 (S.D. Tex. 1975), which held political protest strike not labor
dispute; Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable) with United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine
Workers, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976) (political protest
strike is labor dispute; Norris LaGuardia Act applicable). In New Orleans, the Fifth Circuit
overruled West Gulf Maritime and adopted the United States Steel rule that a political
strike is a labor dispute, expressing preference for a written decision over a summary affir-
mance. 626 F.2d at 465. The New Orleans holding that a political strike is a labor dispute
subject to the Norris-LaGuardia Act overruled another district court decision within the
Fifth Circuit, Harrington & Co. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1416, 356 F.
Supp. 1079 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (political strike not labor dispute for Norris-LaGuardia Act pur-
poses), and conflicts with the view of the Second Circuit. See Khedivial Line, SAE v.
Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1960) (political strike not labor dispute under
Norris-LaGuardia Act definition).
626 F.2d at 465.
Id. at 465-68.
7 626 F.2d at 466; see Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 405
(1976) (no federal statutory impediment to court enforcing arbitration award); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960) (federal court can
order compliance with arbitration award); text accompanying note 65 supra.
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enforcing the arbitrators' back to work orders. 6
In addition, however, the New Orleans court ruled that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act required reversal of the district court order enjoining
the union boycott pending arbitration proceedings." The Fifth Circuit
relied on two landmark Supreme Court cases dealing with the effect of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act on pre-arbitration injunctions."8 In Boys
Markets v. Retail Clerks Union,9 the Supreme Court held that a court
may enjoin a union action prior to arbitration if that action arises from a
dispute that the parties are contractually bound to arbitrate.0 In Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,' the Court emphasized the limited
reach of the Boys Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act." The
Buffalo Forge Court vacated an injunction against a union sympathy
strike because the collective bargaining agreement did not address the
issue that had precipitated the strike.83 The contract contained a no-
strike clause and a mandatory arbitration requirement.84 Although the
question of whether the sympathy strike violated the no-strike clause
was an arbitrable issue,8 5 the Court held that the Boys Markets excep-
tion did not apply because the underlying dispute was not over an ar-
bitrable issue.8 Thus, a pre-arbitration injunction was improper. ' In
11 626 F.2d at 469. Although the Fifth Circuit held in New Orleans that the district
court acted properly in ordering enforcement of the arbitration orders, the circuit court
remanded the case to the district court for modification of the injunction as it applied to two
of the three arbitration orders. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that with respect to the arbitra-
tion orders that addressed the boycotting of a particular ship, the injunction must be limited
to the boycotting of that ship in order to avoid judicial expansion of the arbitrator's order.
Id. at 468; see note 66 supra.
7 626 F.2d at 469; see text accompanying notes 67 & 68 supra.
78 626 F.2d at 466-67.
7 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
Id at 249-53.
8, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
Id. at 404-13.
Id- at 412-13. The striking union in Buffalo Forge had no dispute with its employer.
Id. at 404-05. The union struck in support of other local unions that were striking the same
employer over a contract dispute. Id. at 405.
" Id. at 399-400. In consideration of the employer's promise to arbitrate, the union in
Buffalo Forge agreed not to strike over any issue subject to the arbitration procedure. Id.
at 407.
SId. at 410. The question of whether the sympathy strike in Buffalo Forge violated
the no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement was an arbitrable issue because
the contract embodied the promise not to strike, and all contractual grievances were subject
to arbitration. Id
I Id. at 407-11. Since the sole cause of the Buffalo Forge strike was the union's desire
to support other unions, the strike was not related to any issue subject to arbitration under
the agreement between the union and management. Id. at 407-08. The Buffalo Forge Court
feared that extending the Boys Markets exception beyond cases involving strikes over con-
tractually mandated arbitrable issues would frustrate the Norris-LaGuardia Act's purpose
of limiting the role of the federal courts in labor disputes. Id. at 410-12.
" Id. at 412-13. -
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New Orleans, the Fifth Circuit applied Buffalo Forge to the ILA appeal
of the injunction issued pending arbitration." Since the union had called
the strike as a political protest, and since no arbitrator could resolve the
ILA's complaint with the Soviet Union, the ILA boycott did not fall
within the narrow Boys Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. 9 Therefore, the court vacated the district court's pre-arbitration in-
junction.90
In Hampton Roads Shipping Association v. International Longshore-
men's Association,9' the Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion
regarding a pre-arbitration injunction against the ILA boycott as did the
Fifth Circuit in New Orleans." The Hampton Roads court apparently
assumed that the boycott was a labor dispute within the meaning of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. 3 The court held that since the dispute between
the ILA and the Soviet Union was not over an arbitrable issue, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and Buffalo Forge prohibited a pre-arbitration in-
junction. 4
The Baldovin, Allied, New Orleans, and Hampton Roads cases
denote the unique problems facing an employer or other affected party
when employees walk off the job because of a political dispute such as
the ILA protest against the Soviets. As in the sympathy strike situation,
the union has struck over an issue outside the normal complement of
Is 626 F.2d at 466-67.
9 Id. The New Orleans court followed the Buffalo Forge reasoning and held that
though the question of whether the ILA work-stoppage violated the no-strike agreement
was an arbitrable issue, the union could not be enjoined pending arbitration because the
dispute precipitating the strike was not arbitrable. Id. at 467; see text accompanying notes
83-87 supra.
1 626 F.2d at 469. The New Orleans court upheld the district court's pre-arbitration
order to the extent that the order compelled the parties to arbitrate the question of
whether the ILA had violated the no-strike clause of the contract. Id. at 465-66, 469; see
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457-59 (1957) (§ 301(a) of Labor
Management Relations Act empowers federal courts to compel arbitration and creates ex-
ception to Norris-LaGuardia Act); note 67 supra.
91 631 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1980).
0 Id at 284-86. In Hampton Roads, as in New Orleans, employers of ILA members
sued to force the employees to return to work. Id, at 283; see text accompanying notes 65 &
67 supra. The district court enjoined the boycott, citing union violations of the no-strike
clause and mandatory arbitrationrequirements contained in the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the union and the employers. See 631 F.2d at 283-84.
" See id. (applicability of Norris-LaGuardia Act not questioned); but see note 72 supra
& accompanying text.
" 631 F.2d at 286. As in New Orleans, the Hampton Roads court found that the ques-
tion of whether the ILA boycott violated the no-strike clause was an arbitrable issue. Id. at
285; see note 85 supra. The Fourth Circuit, however, also agreed with the New Orleans con-
clusion that the arbitrability of the boycott's propriety was insufficient to support a Boys
Markets injunction. 631 F.2d at 285; see note 89 supra. Because the union's real dispute was
with the Soviets, and because no arbitrator could resolve that dispute, the Fourth Circuit
held that the ILA work-stoppage was not enjoinable. 631 F.2d at 285-86.
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issues negotiated by labor and management.9 5 After the union has taken
such action, the bargaining table is of little help in resolving the dis-
pute." Therefore, the aggrieved parties must rely on means other than
direct labor-management communication to end the strike.
The conflicting decisions of the Baldovin and Allied courts regarding
the applicability of the Labor Management Relations Act to the ILA
boycott create doubt concerning the success of future attempts to end
politically motivated walkouts by soliciting the aid of the NLRB.
Although the First and Fifth Circuits agree that the ILA action was a
secondary boycott in violation of the Act,9" the Fifth Circuit would deny
the NLRB jurisdiction to enjoin the boycott,9" while the First Circuit ap-
parently would allow a temporary injunction.99 Yet even under the Fifth
Circuit rule that such a boycott does not affect commerce, and conse-
quently is not subject to NLRB regulation, the complainant is not neces-
sarily without a means to enjoin the work stoppage. The Supreme Court
has held that if sections seven or eight of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act do not apply to a dispute, state law will control the action. '
Therefore, if the federal courts deny the NLRB jurisdiction, the com-
plainant may sue in state court under applicable state law.1 ' The com-
plainant may benefit from a decision holding the Labor Management
Relations Act inapplicable, because state law may permit injunctions in
more situations than would the federal statute."' 2 The complainant
" See Freed, Injunctions Against Sympathy Strikes: In Defense of Buffalo Forge, 54
NEW YORK U. L. REV. 289, 303 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Freed]; Lowden & Flaherty, Sym-
pathy Strikes, Arbitration Policy, and the Enforceability of No-Strike Agreements-An
Analysis of Buffalo Forge, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 658 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Lowden & Flaherty]. Discussions dealing with sympathy strikes are cited as illustrative of
the political strike situation because the nature of the dispute underlying a sympathy strike
is similar to that underlying a political strike. Both kinds of strikes involve issues outside
the scope of typical labor-management bargaining.
90 See Freed, supra note 95, at 303; Lowden & Flaherty, supra note 95, at 658.
640 F.2d at 1379; 626 F.2d at 449; see text accompanying note 27 supra.
0 626 F.2d at 454; see text accompanying notes 29-31.
640 F.2d at 1370-74; see note 30 supra.Allied involved a private suit and thus did not
concern the NLRB's jurisdiction as did Baldovin. 640 F.2d at 1371. The First Circuit
recognized, however, that the question of the applicability of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act to the ILA boycott was the same in Allied as in Baldovin. Id.
100 American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 228 (1974); see San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959); note 22 supra.
101 See American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. at 228 (upholding state
court exercise of jurisdiction after finding § 8 of Labor Management Relations Act inap-
plicable). Examples of state statutes under which employers may seek injunctive relief in-
clude ALA. CODE § 25-7-9 (1975) (prohibiting interference with peaceable exercise of lawful
industry); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1321 (1956) (providing injunctive relief for target of
secondary boycott); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.6(2)(d) (Purdon) (1964) (outlawing secondary
boycotts); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154f (Vernon) (1971) (prohibiting secondary
boycotts).
'2 See 27 ALABAMA L. REV. 649, 673 (1975).
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should be aware, however, that some states have enacted their own ver-
sion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, denying the state courts jurisdiction
to issue labor injunctions.1"3
Although a suit instituted in federal or state court to enjoin a work
stoppage similar to the ILA's political boycott may ultimately succeed,
the proceedings will have taken a considerable amount of time.0' Since
the complainant's desire is to end the strike quickly to minimize business
losses, even a victory after protracted litigation can be extremely harm-
ful. In a situation in which the party affected by the political protest is
an employer of the union members, as in New Orleans and Hampton
Roads, the employer can take measures to prevent such harm. A me-
chanism for expedited arbitration would protect management against
the costly delays inherent in attempts to have a court enjoin the union
action. '1 5 An expedited arbitration provision in the collective bargaining
agreement should apply expressly to a no-strike clause specifically for-
bidding political protest strikes.' No question of the arbitrability of
whether the union walkout violates the no-strike clause could then
arise.101 In addition, management should be able to trigger expedited ar-
bitration without prior union consent, thus preventing union circumven-
tion of the dispute resolution process."00
If the employer can obtain a favorable arbitration award quickly, the
need for a pre-arbitration injunction is reduced greatly, and the Buffalo
Forge problem of arbitrability of the underlying dispute is avoided.'
103 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-113 (1958); N.Y. LAB. LAW (McKinney) § 807
(1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206 a-r (Purdon) (1964).
1" See generally Veglahn, Arbitration Costs/Time: Labor and Management Views, 30
LAB L.J. 49 (1979).
105 See Ferguson & DiLorenzo, Forging a Strategy to Combat Sympathy Strikes, 29
SYRACUSE L. REV. 817, 844-45 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ferguson & DiLorenzo]; Lowden &
Flaherty, supra note 95, at 654, 667-68.
Il See Daniel Construction Co., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 190, 100 L.R.R.M. 1201, 1202 (1979)
(no-strike clause must specifically cover sympathy strikes to find sympathy striker in viola-
tion of agreement); Ferguson & DiLorenzo, supra note 105, at 845-48.
'17 See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. at 410 (strike when contract
contains broad no-strike clause creates arbitrable issue).
10 See Ferguson & DiLorenzo, supra note 105, at 848; Lowden & Flaherty, supra note
95, at 664-65.
10 See text accompanying notes 79-87 supra. Employers have been unsuccessful in at-
tempts to circumvent Buffalo Forge and obtain a pre-arbitration injunction against strikes
by describing the underlying dispute in terms consistent with arbitrable issues in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. See Ferguson & DiLorenzo, supra note 105, at 843. Counsel for
Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. (JBT), see text accompanying notes 67 & 68 supra, has
made an ingenious attempt to characterize the ILA boycott as a strike over an arbitrable
issue. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, reported as
New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980).
In its petition for certiorari, JBT asserted that the union boycott was an ILA attempt to
decide with whom JBT does business. 49 U.S.L.W. at 3585 (summ. of cert. pet.). JBT argued
that the dispute was thus arbitrable since the contract expressly reserved to management
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Since management can enforce an arbitration order in the courts,11 the
sooner the order issues the sooner the employees must return to work.
Although an expedited arbitration mechanism can substantially reduce
the time required to end a union political strike, persuading the union to
agree to expedited arbitration may be difficult for management."'
Because Buffalo Forge allows a union to strike over an unarbitrable
issue without the threat of a pre-arbitration injunction, a union may be
disinclined to agree to an expedited arbitration provision that effectively
shortens the period of Norris-LaGuardia Act protection of the strike."'
Thus, management's foresight and negotiating prowess are critical in
preventing business losses due to political protest strikes.'
The boycott of Russian cargoes by the International Longshoremen's
Association has inconvenienced a number of American businesses. Be-
cause the tripartite dispute involving the ILA, the Soviets, and the
American companies does not concern traditional American labor issues,
the dispute does not fit neatly into federal labor law. The recent Fifth
Circuit cases demonstrate that the federal statutes are ill equipped to
handle disputes engendered by union action that is neither directed at
an American employer 1  nor motivated by traditional labor demands.'
Congress could remedy the former situation by declaring its intention
that the Labor Management Relations Act extend to disputes involving
foreign entities that affect business concerns in the United States."'
Such congressional action would cure the present anomaly of disparate
state laws governing union activity that could result in severe disrup-
tion of interstate commerce and could adversely affect United States
foreign relations. "7 In the latter situation, Congress could exclude from
Norris-LaGuardia protection union walkouts motivated by political
views. Such an exclusion would protect American business from the
the right to make such business decisions. Id. JBT also asked the Supreme Court to decide
whether the ILA boycott was a labor dispute as defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, see
text accompanying notes 69-73 supra, and to reconsider Buffalo Forge. Id.
110 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 405 (1976); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960); see text accom-
panying note 75 supra.
"I See Lowden & Flaherty, supra note 95, at 654.
112 See id.
"I For examples of expedited arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agree-
ments, see Agreement between the Johns Hopkins Hospital and District 1199-E, Nat'l
Union of Hospital and Health Care Workers (1980), § 15.3, reprinted in 28 COLL. BARGAINING
(B.N.A.) 13 (May 17, 1979); Agreement between United States Steel Corp. and United
Steelworkers (1981-83), § 7B, reprinted in 29 COLL. BARGAINING (B.N.A.) 14 (Sept. 18, 1980).
"I Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d at 452-54; see text accom-
panying notes 13-44 supra.
"I New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d at 467; see text ac-
companying notes 59-90 supra.
118 See note 17 supra.
m See text accompanying notes 100 & 101 supra.
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burden of labor's political activism while maintaining the Norris-
LaGuardia Act's protection of employee rights to act in concert to fur-
ther their economic position."'
RAND D. WEINBERG
118 See New Orleans v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d at 464 (Norris-LaGuardia
Act designed to protect unions' economic weapons); text accompanying notes 70 & 71 supra.
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